YÜKSEL İNAN -İSLAM YUSUF
In the aftennath of the Bosnian and Kosova tragedies, the European public opinion has criticised European governments for not preventing ethnic conflİcts in the continent and indeed the public opinion has been right in its judgement. Europe has be en perceived as incapable of making any headway on the problems until the VS and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decided to intervene to the recent tragedies Iived at the end of the 1990s. The political wiII was lacking, but alsa the structure to prevent conflİcts. The resulting situation raised the question of the need to set up a new comprehensive security and defence system that wiII give Europe greater responsibiIities for its defence by establishing European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), which has been a long historic aspiration for many Europeans.
The issue is of great importance to Turkey's foreign and security policy. As anan-EV member of NATO, Turkey has been very suspicious of the European initiatives of the establishment of the ESDI. it has supported the creation of ESDI, but not detached from NATO. In the last major summit of NATO held in Washington in April 1999 and in the meeting of Homnce in May 2000, Turkey has opposed the use of NATO capabilities by WEV members, without consultation with the North Atlantic Council (NAC), where the decisions are based on consensus. This paper will try deseribe the ESDI, its evalutian and its effects to European security, as weB as the pasition of Turkey towards the ESDI. We argue that Europe is becoming more [VOL. XXiX European, and is developing a European way of defence and security. Regionalisation tendencies in the world have encouraged the other states to seek their own ways. ESDI is the obvious expression of this tendeney.
ı. European Security in the 1990s
In the new geo-strategic environment of 1990's Europe, issues of identity became as crucial as questions of national interest. 1 The international environment has profoundly shaped Europe's security identity. The rise of Europe's integration together with the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, have signifıcantly affected Europe's security identity. The diffıculties faced by the European countries created new opportunities to consider and reshape the future security architecture of the continent. 2 Europe nccded to reform its security and defence structures that will stimulate original thinking and give her a more active Icadership role. 3 As a response to this need, the European member countries of NATO embarked upon a process designed to strengthen their contribution to NATO's missions and activities, which was called as strengthening, what US President Kennedy called, "the European pillar of the Alliance", and to enable them to assume greater responsibility for the common defence and security, by estabIishing the ESDI within NATO. This was done with a view to providing a genuine European military capability without dupIication the command structures, planning staffs and mi1itary assets and capabilities aıready available within NATO. Such an approach was seen as responding both to the European wish to develop Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the need for a balanced partnership between the North America and Europe.4 The concept of ESDI at present is little than an idea, but it is an idea, which is rapidly coming of age. It is a concept bom of Europeans' determination to take their share of security and defence burden. The identity obliges NATO to make available collective assets of the Alliance to WEU. Its purpose is to enable all European Allies to make a IDore coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of NATO as an expression of their shared responsibilities and to reinforce the transatlantic partnership. The ESDI, together with Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF),5 comprises the basic element of NATO's internal adaptation process, which is guided by the fundamental objectives of ensuring NATO's military effectiveness and also by preserving the transatlantic link. At the Brussels Summit in January 1994, NATO leaders welcomed the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty and the launching of the EU, as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the A11iance. 8 They further announced that they "stand ready to make collectiye assets of the A11iance available, on the basis of the consultation in the North Atlantic Council (NAC), for WEU operations undertaken by the European A11ies in pursuit of their common foreign and security policies."9 NATO Heads of State and Government directed the NAC to examine how the A11iance's political and mi1itary structures might be developed and adapted in order to achieve three objectives: to conduct the Alliance's missions, more efficiently and flexibly; to improve cooperation with WEU; and to refleet the emerging ESDI. "separable but not (pennanently) separate" from NATO.I0 This marked a change from the assumptions of the cold war, when America and also Britain waged a constant diplomatic battle to steer Europeans away from doing their own thing in military matters.
The Evolution of ESDI
At the meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers in Noordwijk, the Netherlands, in November 1994, preliminary conclusions on the fonnulation of a common defence policy were endorsed. 11 This development, which took into account the results of the January 1994 NATO Summit, was welcomed by NATO Foreign Ministers when they met in Brussels at the end of the year. NATO Ministers indicated that the Allies support initiatives to develop multinational operational arrangements and force structures, which would strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance while enabling tne European AlIies to take greater responsibility for the common security and defence. 12 At the meeting of the NAC in Berlin on 3-4 June 1996, NATO Foreign Ministers referred to the building of the ESDI within NATO as an essential part of the adaptation of Alliance structures.
The NATO allies also rccognized the ESDI's institutional embodiment in WEU and undertook to make NATO assets available for operations under the political control and strategic direction of WEU.13
Decisions were taken by the WEU in Paris in May 1997 on the participation of all European Allies in WEU operations using NATO assets and capabilities, and in the planning and preparation for such operations. 14 The basis has therefore been laid for the development of the ESDI within the AlIiance with the full participation of all European Allies. IO The EU's Inter-GovernmentaI Conference (IGC), concIuded in June 1997 with the Treaty of Amsterdam, had a number of implications for further development of the ESDI. In particular, the Treaty made specifıc refcrence to tasks which WEU member countries had defıned as being those which could be carried out under WEU authority -the so-called "Petersberg Missions" which WEU Ministers had agreed to at their me et ing in June 1992 at Petersberg, near Bonn. lS These are namely humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks assigned to combat forces in the context of crisis management situations. AIso with the Trcaty, the EU undertook to step up efforts to create a true ES DI.
The Madrid NATO summit of July 1997 ushercd in a new stage in the process of adaptation of the NATO to the ESDI. At Summit, the AlIiance stressed iı~fırm commitment to support the construction of the ESDI and it made clear its wish for an ESDI to be developed within the Alliance and not outside it. 16 it was made clear that if Europeans want responsibilities to be widely shared, they should take on a greater share of the fınancial commitrnent involved with the Alliance. The essential elements of the ESDI formula endorsed by AlIiance Icaders in Madrid incIude: making available NATO assets and capabilities for WEU operations; providing for the support of WEU operations as an element of the CHF concept; creation of forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU; strengthening of the institutional cooperation between NATO and WEU; involving WEU in NATO's defence planning processes; taking WEU requiremenı<; into account in NATO's new defence planning procedures for developing forces and capabilities; introducing procedures for identifying NATO assets and capabi1ities on which the WEU might wish to draw with the agreement of the NA C; establishing multinational European command arrangements within NATO, which could be used to prepare, support, command and conduct an operation under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU. In this context, the responsibilities of the ISeouncil of Ministers, Peıersberg Declaralion, Bonn, 19 Iune 1992. l6NATO offers severalobjective benefits crucial to the long-tenn success of ESDI. The first is the implicit promise of NATO's full combat power. The second is NATO's unique poIitical decision-making structure. The third is the pre-existence of the military planning and decision-making stmctures necessary to the ESDI. These are views expressed by those who are more Atlantic than European orientcd.
Deputy SACEUR (Supreme A1lied Commander Europe) have been clarifted. He has been identifted as the principal point of contact between the strategic commands and WEU and at the same time, as responsible to co-ordination of NATO planning. He will be a key ftgurc in preparing the transfer of NATO assets to WEU and he has to be prepared to act as operation commandcr for WEU led operation; introducing consultation and information sharing arrangements to provide the co-ordination needed throughout a WEU-led operation undertaken with NATO support; developing military planning and exercises for illustrative WEU missions. the effectiveness of multinational operations will require particular attention to the challenges of interoperability. Improvements in interopcrabiIity and critical capabilities should also strengthen the European pillar in NATO.
NATO has examined areas where improvements in capabilities would make a significant contribution towards meeting the challenges of the future. The aim has be en to develop a common assessment of requirements for the full range of Alliance missions. In identifying the most important areas for improvement, and with a special focus on interoperability, the work has concentrated on the deployability and mobility of Al1iance forces, on their sustainability and logistics, their survivability and effective engagement capability, and on command and control and infonnation systems. The initiative emphasises the importance of the resource dimension of this work as well as the requirement for better coordination between defence planning discipIines; takes into consideration the ability of European Al1ies to undertake WEU-lcd operations; addresses ways to improve capabilities of multinational fonnations; and considers issues such as training, doctrine, human factors, co nce pt development and experimentation, and standardisation.
Achieving the DCI objectives will strengthen European defense capabilities so that European Allies will be able to make a stronger and more coherent contribution to NATO. It will also improve their capability to undertake EV-led operations where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. 20 DCI will contribute to the development of the ESm, which will enable the European allies to make astronger and more coherent contribution to NATO.
EU at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, decided that by the end of 2000, to develop the new military capabilities associated with its Headline and Capability Goals, which is a duplication of the NATO's DCI. Headline and Capability Goals involves the establishment of the EU security and defence decision-making structures and the creation of 60,000 men anny. 
The Structure of the ESDI
In practice, the se arrangements means that if a crisis arise in which the WEU decides to intervene (and NATO decides not to), it would request the use of the Alliance's assets and capabilities, including CJTF headquarters, for conducting an operation under its own control and direction. 22 The request of WEU, however, doesn't leads automaticaııy to have NATO assets available. The decision to make available NATO assets to WEU is made by the NAC, the highest organ in the hierarchy of NATO structure, which decides with consensus, and it is decided on a case-by-case basis. So, a single negative vote of one of 19 members of NATO means a rejection of the request of WEU. Conditions for their transfer to the WEU, as weıı as monitoring their use and for their eventual return or recall, would be registered in a specific agreement between NATO and WEU. During the operation, NATO would monitor the use of its assets and regular political liaison with the WEU would be maintained. European commanders would be nominated to act under WEU political control. The assets would be retumed to NATO at the end of operation or when required. At the Cologne meeting of EU on 3 June 1999. the European Icaders decided to make the EU a military power for the first time in its 42 year history, with command headquarters, staffs and forces of its own for peacekeeping and peace-making missions in future crises. 25 Since the Iate 1999, a single foreign and security policy "czar" of EU has adopted the position to speak for EU on foreign and security matters. The "czar" is Javier Solana, whose post in NATO was occupied by George Robertson, former British Defence Secretary. Robertson has been one of the biggest supporters of NATO's A11ied Powers Operation against Yugoslavia, launched on 24 March 1999.
s. The Future of the ESDI ES DI is graduaIly ceasing to be a largely theoretical aspiration and tuming into a concrete reality. For the first time in history, the Europeans now have the opportunity to build an ESDI. The Balkans bear witness to the failure of European security and defense policy. The ESDI gives hopc that the re will not be anather such failure in the near [uture. Many peoplc feel that the integration of European defense is inevitable and even a necessity. The ESDI is feasible and could prove enormously productive.
The Atlantic Alliance is singularly dependent on the steadfast support and understanding of the American and European public. But in the eve of the 21st century. public support for the A11iance on both sides of the Atlantic will be tested as never before. The smaIl group of diplomats, businessmen, lawyers and academicians who forged the mechanisms of post-war unity has largely passed from the scene in both Europe and the US. A new generation is assuming Icadership, a generatian whose foreign policy vicws were shaped more by the lessons of Vietnam than by the aggressions of Hitler and Stalin. The men and women who will increasingly control westem parliaments, cabinets and political parties over the next years will give comparativcly little thought to 25The European leaders declared: "The Union must have the eapaeity for autonomous aetion, baeked up by eredible military forees, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so in order to respond to international crises." The New York Times, 4 June 1999. why their fathers and grandfathers founded post-w ar institutions. 26 Mareaver, many of the original assumptions underlying those institutions no longer prevail. American and European perceptions outside of Europe are diverging as weıı. 27
Although Westem Europe has aehieved much in economic integration, it is that Europe even now may not of ten speak with one voice. The US often insists on Europe to have "onlyone telephone number" (a word for the fırst time used by Henry Kissinger). The ESDI is not directed against the US, but it does mean that one of its motives is the assertian of difference of a European way.28 In same way, the ESDI reflects constant struggle between the Europcanists and Atlanticist ••, between those who stress more on European way of defence and those who are in favour of strengthening transatlantic relationship. The Europeanists argue that the full members of WEU contribute same 65% of the NATO budget and the assets that is going to be used, are assets of their own. 29 The Atlanticists do not rcally want a working ESDI. They fear the east of developing distinct European defence capabilities. They fear the erosion of transatlantic relations and argue that Atlantic solidarity is as essential as ever in the turbulent new era, moraliyand strategically. So, there is stilI clear lack of the political wilI needed to give the ESDI a boost.
The ESDI is not idea that aims the foundation of "Fortress Europe". The US has encouraged the ESDI to protect NATO's cohesion and effectiveness, by reconciling greater European autonomy in security and defence matters with the maintenance of the transatlantic link. As British Prime-Minister Blair has stressed, were not yet available, and chatting to other people while standing in line.
The product people were af ter was the ESDI. They were not sure how to go about getting it, but they were talking about it." A words expressed by Polish speaker at the Colloquy on ES DI, held by WEU Assembly in Madrid, ı998.
the real task for Europe is to improve its own capabilities to serve Al1iance needs, not to create dupIicative new institutions for their own sake. For all Europe's moves toward "independence" from the US, Europe's national defence budgets are shrinking and its huge military technological lag behind the US is widening every year. Although Western Europe's combined defence budgets add up to two-thirds of the Pentagon's, they yield lcss than a quarter of US' deployable fighting strength. Europe's armies are for the most part are not modernised and incapable of serious power projection. 30
Europe will not be able to achieve parity with the US in defence capabilities without substantial effort, which it does not yet seem to be prepared to make. These realities cannot be ignored. There will be no real sharing of responsibilities bctween Europe and the US as long as the inequality in the means to act continues to increase and as long as the Europeans find it extremely difficull to agree on a definition of their common security and defence objectives.31 There would be no point in giying an institutional structure to a European defence identity within NATO if there were common "European" view on defence and security issues.
ES DI and Turkey
Turkey attaches particular importance to the Atlantic Alliance as the main pillar of the European security architecture. It has supported the adaptation of the Alliance to the new European security environmenL In this context, it has supported calls for strengthened European role in the European defence and security decision-making process. However, it has put reservations to the shift of the European security and defence decision-making from NATO to EU, particularly to WEU.32 Turkey, sharing the same policy with the US, is against institutionalisation of the ESDI at the 30peter W. Rodman, "The Fallout from Kosovo," Foreign Affairs, July-August 1999, p. 5ı.
31Uuis Maria de Puig, "The ESm wirhin NATO," NATO Review, Vol. 46, No. 2, Summer 1998, pp. 6-9. 32press Turkey supparts the strengthening of the WEV as long as it is aimed to strengthen the "European Pillar of NATO."37 However, with the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, when the WEV was recognised as the integral part of the development of the EV, Turkey intensifıed its efforts to strengthen its status in the WEV and its efforts produced wanted results. In the WEV Erfurt Ministerial meeting on 18 December 1997, it was decided to facilitate the participation of associate members in individual operations of WEV. However, so far no decision has been made on the concretc stmctures.
Cebeci in her paper suggests three options of the associate members:
In the fırst option, WEV Associate Membcrs may associate themselves unilaterally with CFSP decisions, and may accept EV directian without any involvemcnt in the EV decision-making process. This option would reflect goodwill on the part of the Associate Members while freeing EV from any kind of commitment towards them. Therefore, it would be appropriate to think of this optian rather as a transitional solution, which would pave the way for the WEV Associate Members to be further involved in the EV/CFSP framework in the future. Another optian would be an arrangement between NATO and the EV that would set the conditions for non-EV Allies' participation. This would be a practicaı and institutionaı solution, but it would be confıned only to operations carried out by the EV with the use of NATO assets and capabilities. The third optian would be the involvement of the WEV Associate Members in the EU/CFSP framework through an Association Agreement. 38
Thus there is need for the solution of the problem on the future pasition of the Associate Members of the WEV in order to create genuine ESDI and CFSP. Any institutionalisation of the ES DI in the EV level, without participation of the European 37''The Transatlantic Alliance: Turkey's Perspcctive," Speech delivered by forrner Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff General Çevik Bir, at Istanbul NAl Congress, May 1-3, 1998 , in elDe lnsight Turkey No. 17, June 1998 membcrs of NATO, will create new dividing lines in the map of the European security architecture.
There is a necessity for the comprehensive non-exclusionary entrance strategy of the EV's CFSP towards the non-EV members of the European continent. 39 It would not be rcalistic to expcct that the credible ESDI will be established without the Europeanisation of the security in the Central and Southeastern Europc. By the Europeanisation of the security, drawing from the definition made by Radelli,40 we mean the a) establishment, b) spread and c) institutionalisation of security and defence rules, paradigms, norms, beliefs and perceptions which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EV security decisions and then transferred to the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies of the countries willing and able to contribute to the European pcace and stability.
Conclusion
The new idea of creating genuine European defence and security system, Le. ESDI, for the forcseeable future will continue to be developed within NATO. H may give way to other future formulas, which will hopeful1y have a better grasp of the realities of tomorrow.
In NATO's southem region, the practical arrangements for the ESDI are aıready being developed. The existence of the Extraction Force in FYR of Macedonia, commanded by a French General, and manned by the French, Dutch, Halian, German, and British forces, as well as European Protection Corps in Kosovo, is certainly a positive sign in the development of an ES DI-st yle command arrangement. 41 What needs to be decided how the Partner countries (the membcrs of the NATO's program of Partnership for Peace) would be abi e to participate in the ESDI, and how will be relationship bctween ESDI and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The VS is 39David Buchan, "Solana hopcs to add value to' EU foreign policy-making", VoI.4,No. 8, 2000, p. 3. inevitably involved in the four comers of the world. American military and political will continue to dominate the peace and war issucs. NATO so far has been sustained in every sense of the word by the US. Whether this is liked or not, the US needs Europe and Europe needs the US. Both sides, however, know that the new concept of ESDI will give a new shape to their partnership, the direction in which such partnership can be found has already been defined as "burden sharing." The Europeanisation of Europe needs not be seen as a threat. It is in fact quite nonnal development and evcn desirable by both sides of the Atlantic.
